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Abstract 
The informal sector is typically characterised as being very heterogeneous and 
possibly composed of two clearly distinct segments, sometimes called the 
lower and upper tier. However, empirical evidence shows that even among 
lower tier entrepreneurs profitability can be quite high. We combine these 
findings and develop an innovative approach to identify what we call 
‘constrained gazelles’, next to the well-known survivalists in the lower tier and 
growth-oriented top-performers in the upper tier. Our sample of informal 
entrepreneurs in seven West-African countries allows to link the relative size of 
these three groups to the structural and macroeconomic environment in these 
countries. 
Keywords 
Informality, entrepreneurship, capital, managerial ability, targeting, West-
Africa. 
JEL codes: D22, O17.
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1 INTRODUCTION∗ 
Informal sector heterogeneity has been recognized for decades (Mead and Morrisson 1996). 
From an initial perception of a dichotomy, coined by Hart (1972), the academic debate moved 
towards seeing the myriad variation in types of firms, entrepreneurs and workers as a continuum, 
within which authors identified various types of segmentation, at least partly depending on their 
thematic interest, disciplinary background, and adherence to particular strands in development 
theory (Lubbel, 1991; Chen et al. 2005). Also context specificity is an important underlying source 
of heterogeneity. For example, the debate on the informal sector in Latin America and in 
economically more dynamic regions of South East Asia focuses on whether most informal 
entrepreneurs would prefer to have a rather secure job or are constrained genuine entrepreneurs 
(Maloney, 2004; De Mel et al., 2010). For economically less dynamic regions in Africa with a 
glaring missing middle of small and medium-sized enterprises (Fafchamps, 1996; Tybout, 2000), 
the debate has focused on the often visible bifurcation between a rather small group of successful 
entrepreneurs and a much larger group of entrepreneurs that apparently struggle to survive 
(House, 1984; Fields, 1990; Rogerson, 1996; Mead and Liedholm, 1998; ILO, 2002; World Bank, 
2007; Nichter and Goldmark, 2009). A focus on this qualitative bifurcation has proven useful to 
avoid one-size-fits-all thinking, but it also has inhibited progress in identifying possible other 
segments of informal entrepreneurs.i Moreover, progress in producing more rigorous and 
generalizable findings on informal entrepreneurs has been hampered because representative 
samples hardly exist.  
To push the debate forward, we apply an innovative empirical strategy to a unique data set 
based on a representative sample of informal entrepreneurs in seven capital cities in francophone 
West Africa. Instead of two, we identify three groups of entrepreneurs: First, the well-known 
success stories or top performers; second, a group of constrained gazellesii who share some 
characteristics with these top performers such as education, language skills, sector choice and 
some basic management abilities, but who are not (yet) successful; and third, a group of survival 
entrepreneurs with fundamentally different characteristics. While constrained gazelles and top 
performers have some similarities, the constrained gazelles – similar to survivalists – possess very 
low levels of capital. Our data show that constrained gazelles earn a very high marginal return to 
capital, which underscores their potential to become top performers. Moreover, our empirical 
strategy enables us to arrive at some clear criteria for separating out constrained gazelles, so that 
they can benefit from targeted interventions to unlock their potential. Given that our findings are 
based on a representative sample, we also discuss the extent to which these criteria could be 
applied more generically to identify potentially successful but constrained entrepreneurs in the 
urban informal sector in other regions of the developing world. This could significantly improve 
                                                
∗ This research is part of a project entitled “Unlocking potential: Tackling economic, institutional and 
social constraints of informal entrepreneurship in Sub-Saharan Africa” (http://www.iss.nl/informality) 
funded by the Austrian, German, Norwegian, Korean and Swiss Government through the World Bank’s 
Multi Donor Trust Fund Project: “Labor Markets, Job Creation, and Economic Growth, Scaling up 
Research, Capacity Building, and Action on the Ground”. The financial support is gratefully 
acknowledged. The project is led by the International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, The Hague, The Netherlands and jointly undertaken with AFRISTAT, Bamako, Mali, DIAL-
IRD, Paris, France, the German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany and the Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany. We thank three anonymous referees for very helpful 
comments.  
Authors information: Michael Grimm, International Institute of Social Studies(ISS), Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, The Hague, The Netherlands, and Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn, Germany; 
Peter Knorringa, International Institute of Social Studies(ISS); and Jann Lay, GIGA German Institute of 
Global and Area Studies, Hamburg, Germany and University of Göttingen, Germany. Corresponding 
author is Michael Grimm: grimm (at) iss.nl. 
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targeting and thus the effectiveness of informal sector interventions. Finally, given the multi-
sectoral and cross-country dimensions of our data, we can link the relative size of the three 
groups of entrepreneurs to the sectoral composition and the macroeconomic environment in 
these seven countries.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we combine key findings 
from the two main analytical views on why distinct groups of informal entrepreneurs co-exist. 
Moreover, we position constrained gazelles in the intersection between these views. Section 3 
discusses the context and data. Section 4 derives and characterises three distinct groups of 
entrepreneurs. Section 5 analyzes differences in productivity across these three groups. Section 6 
discusses policy implications and Section 7 summarises our findings. 
2 COMBINING VIEWS ON HETEREGONEITY 
Different analytical views exist on why heterogeneity persists among informal entrepreneurs with 
differing policy implications. Given our focus on seven capital cities in francophone West Africa, 
an economically less dynamic region with a wide gap between its formal and informal economies, 
we focus on the following two main strands in the literature. The first multi-disciplinary strand 
posits the existence of two qualitatively distinct subgroups of entrepreneurs. On the one hand, 
relatively better-off growth-oriented entrepreneurs who can afford to specialise and can focus on 
accumulation. On the other hand, survival entrepreneurs who need to be risk averse, and thus 
diversify their economic activities in search of stability. The main policy implication is that these 
two distinct groups require distinct policy approaches: a targeted business development approach 
for growth-oriented entrepreneurs and a more generic approach to assist survival entrepreneurs 
in enhancing their employability and alleviating their poverty (Berner et al., 2012; Cotter, 1996; 
Mead and Liedholm, 1998).  
A second strand – including a study based on the same data used in this paper – shows that 
entrepreneurs who operate with low levels of invested capital can earn high returns to capital (De 
Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff, 2008; McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006; Kremer, Lee and Robinson 
2010; Grimm, Krüger and Lay, 2011). In other words, in these firms the return to investing in an 
additional hammer or a basket to carry goods to the market is remarkably high. Hence, this 
literature contradicts the validity of the poverty trap models that often assume that some fixed 
costs have to be incurred before above subsistence returns can be earned (Banerjee and Newman, 
1993) and that generally associate low productivity and product quality to informal firms as 
separate from formal firms (La Porta and Shleifer 2011). The high returns to capital literature also 
casts serious doubt on the overriding assumption in much of the first strand of informal sector 
literature that none of the smallest firms can generate significant value added. Moreover, among 
practitioners it is commonplace to say that the smallest entrepreneurs are not entrepreneurial and 
would be better off finding a job. While this may well be true for real survival-oriented 
entrepreneurs, we will argue that this does not hold for a significant third segment of informal 
entrepreneurs, which we call constrained gazelles (Boston and Boston, 2007).iii  
The two strands in the literature mentioned above usually rely on different (types of) data 
sets and have not systematically tackled their distinct assumptions. In this study we will 
demonstrate the added value of combining the qualitative characteristics of informal 
entrepreneurs with their returns to capital in one representative data set. We will show that 
combining these analytical views allows us to identify a third group of potentially successful 
entrepreneurs that so far remained ‘hidden’ inside the amorphous survival segment. Moreover, 
our empirical strategy allows isolating these constrained gazelles from top performers and 
survivalists, a key precondition for effective targeting.A final point to consider in this section is 
the empirical importance of constrained gazelles in the informal sector. As we will show in some 
detail below, constrained gazelles are a significant group in the informal sector of urban West 
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Africa, their share ranging from between 20% to 35%, with outliers of even almost 60%, 
depending on the country and the method of calculation. Country comparisons suggest that it is 
more likely to find more constrained gazelles in more dynamic economies. As the countries in 
our sample arguably possess less dynamic economies compared to many other regions in the 
world, we believe that the presence of constrained gazelles will also be significant in other 
regions.  
3 DATA SOURCE AND DESCRIPTIVE OVERVIEW 
(a)  Enquêtes 1-2-3 
For our empirical analysis we use a set of survey data stemming from the so-called 1-2-3 surveys 
or in its French synonym ‘Enquêtes 1-2-3’. The data have been collected in 2001 and 2002 in 
seven urban centers in West Africa: Abidjan, Bamako, Cotonou, Dakar, Niamey, Lomé and 
Ouagadougou.iv A 1-2-3 survey is a multi-layer survey organized in three phases and specifically 
designed to study the informal sector (see Brilleau, Ouedraogo and Roubaud (2005) for a 
presentation of data and methodology). Phase 1 is a representative labor force survey collecting 
detailed information about individual socio-demographic characteristics and employment. Phase 
2 is a survey which interviews a sub-sample of informal production units identified in Phase 1. 
The focus of this phase is on the characteristics of the entrepreneurs and their production unit, 
including the characteristics of employed workers. It also contains detailed information on costs, 
input use, investment, sales and the unit’s forward and backward linkages. Phase 3 is a household 
expenditure survey interviewing (again) a representative sub-sample of Phase 1 and hence part of 
the Phase 2 households. The data of all three phases are organized such that it can be linked. 
Hence, for a (representative) sub-sample of informal entrepreneurs we have information from 
Phase 1 and Phase 2 (n=6,580) and, again for a subsample, information from all three phases. 
Phase 3 is not available for Abidjan because of the onset of violence in 2001 before it could be 
implemented.  
Besides the detail of information, a major advantage of the 1-2-3 survey is that Phase 1 
ensures that Phase 2 delivers a representative picture of the informal sector, because being 
sampled does for instance not depend on whether the entrepreneur has a fixed location or simply 
operates a business at home or in a fully mobile way. Thus the survey also includes entrepreneurs 
who are likely to be overseen in one-stage surveys where the sample population is produced from 
enterprise sampling frames. The 1-2-3 surveys define informal enterprises as small production 
units that (a) do not have written formal accounts or (b) are not registered with the tax 
administration or both. Part (b) of this definition varies slightly between countries, as registration 
may not always refer to registration with tax authorities. The 1-2-3 surveys do not apply a size 
criterion. The detail of information, the representativeness and the cross-country dimension 
make this data particularly suitable for our purpose.  
(b) Heterogeneity of sampled firms 
Table 1 shows some basic characteristics of the sampled firms and their owners for the four 
quartiles and the top decile of the capital distribution. Capital is measured as the used physical 
capital stock evaluated at replacement costs. It includes buildings, machines, furniture, vehicles 
and tools used for the business. Price differences between countries are adjusted via the use of 
PPPs. This is explained along with definitions for all other used variables in Table A1 in the 
Appendix. As expected the variation across capital quartiles is large in many of the shown 
characteristics. The most striking is probably gender. Whereas in the bottom quartile 65% of the 
firm managers are women, it is only 30% in the top quartile. 37% of the entrepreneurs in the 
bottom quartile speak French compared to 64% in the top quartile. In the bottom quartile 74% 
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are without any formal education while this percentage is ‘only’ 56% in the top quartile. In this 
quartile 8.2% have at least some secondary education, which is the case for only 4.1% in the 
bottom quartile. However, maybe surprisingly, firm age does almost not vary across the capital 
distribution. It also seems as if the household’s activity portfolio had only limited impact on 
capital accumulation of informal firms.  
We cannot see more capital in firms that belong to households with income from a formal 
activity, possibly because the dominance of formal earnings implies that entrepreneurial activities 
constitute a secondary activity only complementing the main source of income. Regarding the 
sectoral distribution, we tend to find more top quartile firms in the transport, hotel and restaurant 
and repair services sectors. 
4 IDENTIFICATION OF CONSTRAINED GAZELLES 
Our empirical strategy to identify three categories of informal entrepreneurs is as follows:  First 
we define a category of ‘top performers’ based on used physical capital and generated value 
added. Then, we identify a set of owner and firm characteristics that are correlated with these 
performance measures. Using these correlations we predict the empirical probability of being a 
‘top-performer’. Based on the actual status of being a top performer and the predicted probability 
of being one (although the entrepreneur is not), we then classify entrepreneurs into three groups: 
‘top performers’, ‘constrained gazelles’ and ‘survivalists’. ‘Constrained gazelles’ are those 
entrepreneurs who have a high empirical probability of being a ‘top-performer’ given their 
observable characteristics. Based on these classifications, we discuss the differences in the informal 
sector composition across countries and relate these differences to the country-specific structural 
and macroeconomic environment. Finally, we identify and discuss the structural and behavioural 
differences between these groups. A particular focus will be on factors that are related to the way 
entrepreneurs manage their firms.  
(a) Defining a top performer 
To define ‘top-performers’ we combine a size and a productivity criterion. The size reflects past 
performance and the capacity to grow. Productivity measures current performance. We proceed 
in two steps. First, we select those entrepreneurs in our sample that are in the top 25% of the 
capital distribution of their respective country. From these firms, we then select the 40% with the 
highest capital profitability, i.e. the highest value added per unit of physical capital. This means 
that the group of top-performers comprises by definition 10% of all sampled entrepreneurs in 
every country.  Value added is measured as turnover minus the costs for intermediate inputs; 
hence it includes all paid wages, the implied income of the owner and unpaid family members or 
other unpaid workers, such as trainees. Alternatively, one could just use the income of the owner. 
However, given that family labour is widespread with a number of entrepreneurs reporting wages 
for those family members, we prefer value added over the owner’s income. Moreover, we do not 
use a performance criterion based on employed staff. Informal firms typically do not conclude 
labour contracts, are often engaged in seasonal activities and can hardly be separated from the 
household. This is why current employment is probably not a very reliable size indicator. We test, 
however, the robustness of our approach using two alternative definitions; one where 
performance is just determined by total value added and another using value added per worker. It 
turns out that the correlation between all three definitions is relatively high (close to 60% and 
more) and that there are no substantial differences in terms of the shares of top-performers 
across economic sectors. The alternative definitions yield slightly more top-performers in the 
very capital intensive sectors transport and construction as well as in the less capital intensive 
sectors of retail and petty trade. The results hence do not seem to be biased by using capital as a 
size criterion. In addition, capital accumulation is central to economic growth.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
  1st (bottom) 2nd 3rd 4th (top) Top 
  All quartile quartile quartile quartile Decile 
Owner characteristics       
Male  0.500 0.353 0.369 0.582 0.697 0.779 
Age owner 36.3 35.0 36.5 36.4 37.3 38.3 
Speaks French 0.476 0.373 0.360 0.532 0.637 0.701 
No diploma 0.689 0.740 0.785 0.673 0.559 0.499 
Primary completed 0.200 0.161 0.151 0.220 0.268 0.283 
Some secondary 0.053 0.041 0.035 0.053 0.082 0.094 
Other post primary 0.058 0.057 0.029 0.054 0.091 0.124 
Ethnic group 1 0.410 0.427 0.410 0.412 0.392 0.405 
Ethnic group 2 0.203 0.162 0.191 0.198 0.262 0.275 
Ethnic group 3 0.098 0.103 0.089 0.095 0.106 0.098 
Household Characteristics       
Household size 6.883 7.350 7.027 6.838 6.311 6.232 
Only informal firm 0.796 0.792 0.802 0.781 0.810 0.841 
Public wage earner 0.103 0.113 0.094 0.113 0.093 0.067 
Private formal wage earner 0.095 0.089 0.102 0.102 0.086 0.080 
Other combination 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.013 0.014 
Firm characteristics       
Age of firm 8.1 7.3 8.4 8.6 8.0 8.3 
Ann. VA in intl.$ PPP 5370.3 2712.4 3052.1 5585.9 10098.2 16363.2 
Monthly hours owner 201.5 184.8 191.4 203.3 226.6 235.7 
Total monthly hours 337.6 203.5 244.7 351.6 550.1 645.6 
Total staff incl. owner 1.7 1.1 1.3 1.8 2.4 2.8 
Hired paid staff 0.205 0.036 0.067 0.214 0.503 0.707 
No capital  0.138 0.541 0 0 0 0 
Physical. cap. in intl. $ PPP 1004.0 4.2 39.3 207.2 3768.9 7923.4 
Sector       
Clothing and apparel 0.108 0.072 0.041 0.172 0.146 0.123 
Other manufact. and food 0.158 0.113 0.186 0.173 0.159 0.152 
Construction 0.075 0.024 0.104 0.116 0.059 0.053 
Wholesale/retail shops 0.101 0.111 0.090 0.089 0.113 0.123 
Petty trading 0.274 0.447 0.371 0.162 0.115 0.073 
Hotels and restaurants 0.063 0.014 0.069 0.099 0.069 0.058 
Repair services 0.057 0.022 0.033 0.084 0.089 0.081 
Transport 0.046 0.025 0.008 0.018 0.134 0.216 
Other services 0.119 0.172 0.098 0.088 0.116 0.122 
Country       
Benin 0.142 0.060 0.110 0.129 0.269 0.315 
Burkina Faso 0.148 0.170 0.126 0.146 0.149 0.172 
Cote d'Ivoire 0.151 0.086 0.158 0.201 0.160 0.142 
Mali 0.149 0.231 0.138 0.127 0.097 0.085 
Niger 0.113 0.131 0.151 0.104 0.067 0.054 
Senegal 0.153 0.170 0.161 0.152 0.128 0.121 
Togo 0.145 0.152 0.155 0.141 0.131 0.110 
N 6558 1662 1606 1645 1645 656 
Source: 123-survey, WAEMU 2001; own computations. 
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(b) Partitioning into top-performers, constrained gazelles and survivalists 
The set of variables that are correlated with being part of the group of top-performers should be 
largely given or predetermined at the start of the enterprise. ‘Predetermined’ thus simply means 
determined prior in time. These factors may still be endogenous in an econometric sense, because 
both the entrepreneur’s success and the correlated variables may depend on the same third 
variables, for instance family background. We include in the set of predetermined factors: age, 
age squared, gender, formal education, knowledge of French, and the motivation of the 
entrepreneur to set up the enterprise. The motivation of the entrepreneur to set up the enterprise 
is measured via a dummy variable that takes the value ‘one’ if the entrepreneur created the 
enterprise because he or she could not find a job as a wage worker (either in a small or larger 
company). Alternative answers to this question are ‘to receive higher earnings’, ‘prefer to be 
independent’ and ‘enterprise created because of a family tradition’. If the respondent chooses one 
of these alternative answers, we take this are a sign of a minimum ‘entrepreneurial spirit’. In the 
literature, this variable is sometimes used as a measure of the entrepreneur’s ability (see e.g. 
McKenzie and Woodruff, 2006). Amin (2009) uses the same variable to separate ‘opportunity’ 
from ‘necessity’ firms. In addition to the predetermined factors, we include sector and country 
dummies and control for the firm’s age to avoid discriminating against younger firms with a high 
potential. We think the virtue of our approach is that at the start we limit the classification to a 
fairly limited set of variables, which are not much prone to endogeneity issues, but can then show 
below that based on these variables we identify a group of entrepreneurs that have business skills 
which resemble in many respects those of the top-performers but are clearly different of those 
characterizing survivalists. We take this then as an indication that this group has a potential that 
can be unlocked. Once we have analyzed structural and behavioral differences between these 
three groups, we can further refine the classification of these entrepreneurs into three groups. 
This will be done at the end of this section. 
Hence, to start with, we regress the binary variable ‘being a top-performer’, YPerf, on the list 
of variables just discussed assuming that there is a latent unobserved probability of being a ‘top 
performer’ underlying the observed binary variable being or not being part of that group. Hence, 
the appropriate econometric model is a binary response model. We estimate a probit model of 
the following form: 
 
 )()1(Pr 1'0 iiPerfi XY ωββθ ++== , (1) 
 
where Xi stands for the vector of the above owner and firm characteristics.  ß is the vector of 
coefficients that describes how these characteristics relate to the probability of being a top-
performer. θ stands for the cumulative standard normal distribution function, i.e. the underlying 
probability distribution in a probit model. Table 2 shows the results of this regression. We show 
the estimated coefficients and the implied marginal effects, i.e. the change in the underlying 
probability if the explaining variable is changed by one unit (from zero to one for binary 
variables) while all other variables are kept at the sample means. Means of the independent 
variables can be found in Table 1. 
We see that the probability of being a ‘top-performer’ is increasing in age, but at a decreasing 
rate (the quadratic term is negative). Firms managed by men are more likely to be in the group of 
top-performers than firms managed by women. The marginal effect indicates a higher chance by 
almost 9 percentage points for men being in that group. Given that overall only 10% of all 
entrepreneurs are classified as top-performers, this effect points to some important gender issues, 
such as access to household resources and the need of women to combine their professional 
activity with housework. The effect of schooling is positive and significant, but there is no 
significant difference between primary, secondary and any other type of higher  
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Table 2: Probability of being a top-performer (Probit model) 
  Coefficients Marginal effects 
Age owner 0.049*** 0.007 
 
(0.012) 
 Age owner squared -0.055*** -0.008 
 
(0.015) 
 Male (=1) 0.600*** 0.087 
 
(0.058) 
 No diploma Ref. 
 
   Primary completed 0.210*** 0.033 
 
(0.064) 
 Some secondary 0.188* 0.030 
 
(0.101) 
 Other post primary 0.158 0.025 
 
(0.100) 
 Speaks French (=1) 0.165*** 0.024 
 
(0.061) 
 No other opportunity -0.185*** -0.024 
 
(0.058) 
 Age of firm 0.008*** 0.001 
 
(0.003) 
 Clothing and apparel Ref. 
 
   Other manufact. and food -0.216** -0.028 
 
(0.085) 
 Construction -0.287*** -0.034 
 
(0.100) 
 Wholesale/retail shops -0.282*** -0.034 
 
(0.096) 
 Petty trading -0.496*** -0.061 
 
(0.085) 
 Hotels and restaurants 0.300*** 0.051 
 
(0.105) 
 Repair services -0.193* -0.024 
 
(0.108) 
 Transport 0.108 0.017 
 
(0.108) 
 Other services -0.395*** -0.045 
 
(0.094) 
 Country effects yes 
 Pseudo-R2 0.094   
N 6503   
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors (in parentheses) are  
clustered at neighborhood level. 
Source: 123-survey, WAEMU 2001; own estimations. 
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than primary schooling, including technical schooling. Speaking French also increases the 
probability of being a ‘top performer’ (by 2.5 percentage points). The age of the firm has a small 
positive effect; at the margin an increase in the firm’s age by one year increases its probability of 
being a top-performer by just 0.1 percentage point). The sector effects indicate that firms in the 
hotel and restaurant or in the transport sector have a higher probability of being in the group of 
top-performers relative to the firms that are in textile manufacturing (clothing and apparel). 
Almost all country effects (not shown) are insignificant. They should be insignificant, as we 
simply define 10% of the firms as top-performers in every country. The small differences we still 
see are just driven by the small differences in sample sizes across countries and possibly by the 
non-linearity of the choice model. 
Based on this regression, we now predict for every entrepreneur in the sample the statistical 
probability of being a top-performer – conditional on the estimated parameters β0 and β1 and on 
the vector of observed variables X, i.e. we compute 
 
 )ˆˆ()1r(Pˆ 1'0 ββθ iPerfi XY +== , (2) 
 
where ‘hats’ indicate estimated parameters. We use these predicted probabilities to partition in 
each country the sample of informal entrepreneurs into three groups: top-performers, 
constrained gazelles and survivalists. The ‘top-performers’ are those entrepreneurs that are 
actually ‘top-performers’, i.e. the top 40% entrepreneurs in terms of capital productivity from the 
top 25% of the distribution of capital. The shares of the two other groups are determined as 
follows: In each country, we choose the cut-off point for )1r(Pˆ =PerfiY  between constrained 
gazelles and survivalists such that the mean of )1r(Pˆ =PerfiY  is the same in the group of top-
performers and constrained gazelles, i.e. constrained gazelles should on average be equally likely 
to be a top-performer than the actual performers. This should imply that the distribution of the 
observable variables X is the same in both groups. This is confirmed by a regression (results not 
presented) of Equation (1) on the pooled sample of top-performers and constrained gazelles; all 
regression coefficients are insignificant, meaning that there can only be minor (and no systematic) 
differences in the observables between both groups. This will be further discussed below. As 
survivalists we define all entrepreneurs that have )1r(Pˆ =PerfiY  below the threshold. We also 
check graphically whether these partitions satisfy two basic criteria. First, the distribution of 
predicted probabilities, )1r(Pˆ =PerfiY , of top-performers and constrained gazelles should more or 
less overlap while the distribution of survivalists should be clearly distinct. As illustrated in Figure 
1 (Kernel densities), this is the case. Second, the distribution of capital should show similarly low 
levels of capital for survivalists and constrained gazelles, while top-performer’s higher capital 
stock should be clearly visible. Indeed, Figure 2 shows this pattern. Although the distribution of 
capital of constrained gazelles is a bit more on the right than the one of survivalists, it is far closer 
to the latter than to the one by top-performers, i.e. constrained gazelles have only slightly more 
capital than survivalists. Hence, constrained gazelles might have a high potential to increase their 
capital stock.  
In Table 3, we present the partition into the three informal sector segments for each of the 
seven countries and relate the differences in this partition across countries to the country-specific 
structural and macroeconomic environment. Obviously, one has to be careful in drawing 
conclusions based on seven data points, but some correlations clearly stand out. First, the share 
of survivalists is strongly negatively correlated with the share of private formal and public sector 
employment and strongly positively correlated with the urbanisation rate and the share of 
agriculture in GDP. We also consider various indicators that measure in one way or another the 
quality of the ‘business climate’, namely the number of days it takes to enforce a contract – drawn 
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from the World Bank’s ‘doing business surveys’ - and two measures drawn from the business 
freedom data base hosted by the Heritage Foundation (business freedom, investment freedom). 
All three measures suggest that a better business climate is associated with a lower share of 
survivalists. Both data bases provide alternative indicators, but the three selected ones are in our 
view those that are the most relevant for informal small enterprises. In addition, these are 
available for 2001 or, in case of doing business, at least for 2003. To summarize, all these 
correlations are plausible and point to important bottlenecks that keep many people in survival-
oriented self-employment with little chance of developing a dynamic business. It is interesting to 
see that GNI is not correlated with the share of survivalists, suggesting that structural features 
and the quality of the business climate, as measured here, seem to matter more than the income 
level per se. The general level of formal education does also only play a minor role.  
(c) Socio-demographic heterogeneity and sector choice 
We now study the heterogeneity in the informal sector across these three groups. The upper 
panel of Table 4 (basic characteristics) shows the means of the variables that were used to 
estimate Equation (1) and to predict )1r(Pˆ =PerfiY  (only country dummies are not shown). By 
construction, of course, we expect similar means for the group of top-performers and 
constrained gazelles, while the group of survivalists should differ in those characteristics – as 
shown above. The most striking contrast is obtained for the variable gender; only 13% of 
survivalist firms are led by men. The dominant sector among survivalists is clearly ‘petty trade’ 
with some activity in ‘other manufacturing and food processing’ and ‘other services’. In contrast, 
the activities of the two other groups are more equally distributed across sectors with most 
entrepreneurs engaged in ‘other manufacturing and food processing’, ‘clothing and apparel’ and 
‘construction’. The transport sector is the fourth most important sector of top-performers. The 
fact that ‘other manufacturing and food processing’ is important for all groups, illustrates this 
sector’s heterogeneity in terms of firm performance. Comparing survivalists and constrained 
gazelles it turns out that survivalists are a bit younger (34.7 vs. 37.7 years), have lower education, 
speak French less often, show less ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ and, on average, have firms that are 
younger (6.4 vs. 9.4 years). In Table 4 we also show the mean capital and mean labour used by 
these firms. Top-performers employ on average 2.7 workers including the owner, while 
constrained gazelles employ 1.8 and survivalists only 1.3 workers.  
(d) Structural heterogeneity  
We now focus on structural variables that have not been used in determining group membership. 
These variables come from the economic, institutional as well as the social domain. Among the 
economic factors we consider whether the enterprise was set up by the entrepreneur alone or 
with another person. We also take into account whether other household members of the 
entrepreneur (or the entrepreneur him/her-self) are employed in the public or formal private 
sector. Again, setting up an enterprise with others or having access to formal employment and 
regular earnings may lift credit market constraints and allow sharing business related risks. For 
the same reason, we include an asset index based on the ownership of various non-business 
assets in the household of the entrepreneur. This index is constructed using principal component 
analysis (Filmer and Pritchett, 2001; Sahn and Stifel, 2000). We also include the type of location 
used by the entrepreneur. An additional economic factor is whether an entrepreneur has 
accomplished an apprenticeship in a larger firm or brings some experience from such a firm. 
Institutional factors focus on access to public services, such as access to water, electricity and 
telecommunication. The social factors include a possible entrepreneurial tradition of the 
household in this particular activity. Social networks and connectedness that may improve access 
to output and factor markets are proxied by whether the entrepreneur belongs to the first, 
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Figure 1: Distribution of predicted probability of being a top-performer 
 
 
  
Source: 123-survey, WAEMU 2001; own estimations. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Distribution of capital 
 
Source: 123-survey, WAEMU 2001; own estimations. 
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second, third or less important ethnic group in the country (in terms of the proportion), by the 
share of the population in the entrepreneur’s neighbourhood (cluster) that belong to 
entrepreneur’s ethnic group and by migrant status (distinguishing non-migrants, internal 
migrants, (international) immigrants and return migrants). The second panel of Table 4 (structural 
factors) presents the means of all variables for the three groups of entrepreneurs. Obviously, 
none of these variables can be considered unambiguously exogenous, but the objective is not to 
identify causal relationships, but to identify factors that correlate with entrepreneurial success and 
to separate these from those that seem rather unrelated. Identifying causal relationships needs a 
different type of analysis and is of course the next step towards the design of specific policies that 
would allow lifting constrained gazelles to the group of top-performers.  
A first interesting finding is the correlation between the way the firm was set up and the 
classification across the three groups of entrepreneurs. Both top-performers and constrained 
gazelles have done this as a ‘joint venture’ in almost in one out of ten cases. This happens less 
frequently among survivalists. However, the household activity portfolio does not significantly 
differ across the three groups. Hence, entrepreneurs in households with a formal income source 
are not systematically more successful than entrepreneurs without such links. This does of course 
not imply that such regular income is not a potential advantage. The lack of correlation might 
reflect that some households with formal-wage-earning household members pursue the informal 
entrepreneurial activity as a side activity, maybe undertaken by the spouse, which is not intended 
to grow in size or to be very important in general. This interpretation is supported by the fact 
that wealth, in contrast, shows a quite sizeable correlation with success. Top-performers clearly 
come from wealthier households. This may be a sign of a lack of access to credit that holds back 
the group of constrained gazelles. Wealthier people may also have other (non-observed) traits 
that give them better opportunities to set up and develop their business. Of course, it is also 
possible that successful entrepreneurs simply accumulate more wealth. Four other correlations 
stand out. First, access to electricity and telecommunication is the highest among top-performers 
and, with the exception of water, still higher among constrained gazelles than among survivalists. 
Second, top-performers operate more often from fixed locations (shops and restaurants) than 
from mobile selling points. This applies also to constrained gazelles, relative to survivalist, but to 
a lesser extent. Third, pursuing an activity because of a family tradition is associated with a 
significantly lower probability of being a top-performer). Fourth, internal and return migrants 
(from abroad) are less likely than non-migrants to belong to the top-performers. In contrast, 
international migrants, i.e. migrants coming from neighbouring countries or even further away, 
are not different from non-migrants in that respect. To summarize, this part of Table 4 suggests 
that constrained gazelles differ from top-performers mainly in terms of wealth, access to utilities 
and the type of location they can use. This, again, may be an indication that constrained gazelles 
are not mainly restricted by internal constraints, such as skills, but rather by external constraints, 
such as access to capital. With respect to prior experience in a larger firm, which should be a 
major determinant of business relevant skills, both groups are in fact very similar and clearly 
different from survivalists.  
16 
 
Table 3: Partition of informal sector and structural characteristics of regional labour markets 
  Benin Burkina Faso 
Cote 
d'Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo 
Partition informal sector (shares)        
Top-performers  0.099 0.097 0.096 0.099 0.097 0.099 0.096 
Constrained gazelles 0.280 0.434 0.587 0.539 0.581 0.439 0.348 
Survivalists 0.620 0.469 0.317 0.362 0.322 0.462 0.556 
                
Structural characteristics (2001)        
Geography coastal Sahel coastal Sahel Sahel coastal coastal 
Dominant religion Christian Muslim Christian Muslim Muslim Muslim Christian 
GNI per capita, PPP (current Intl. $)a 1170 850 1450 760 530 1330 680 
Private/public sector employment, %b 19.7 26.6 25.3 22.5 29.9 23.6 19.0 
Adult literacy rate, % a 35 22 49 24 9 39 53 
Share w/t any schooling (10 y. and older), % b 20.2 33.7 28.5 40.8 36.3 31.4 16.1 
Urbanisation rate, % a 38 17 44 28 16 41 37 
Agriculture, value added % of GDP a 36 37 25 38 40 19 38 
Time to enforce a contract (days)c 720 446 525 860 360 780 535 
Business freedom d 70 55 55 70 55 55 40 
Investment freedom d 50 70 50 70 30 50 30 
Sources: a) World Development Indicators, World Bank (2009), b) 1-2-3 Survey, phase 1, Brilleau, Roubaud and Torelli (2005), c)  World Bank, Doing business  
survey, Djankov et al. (2002) and d)  Business Freedom Data Base/Heritage Foundation, Score between 0 (worst) – 100 (best) (http://www.heritage.org/index/explore)  
The partition of the informal sector is based on the 123-survey, WAEMU 2001 and own estimations. 
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Table 4: Group comparisonTable notes see, next page. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5)   
    t-Test  t-Test  
  Survivalists 
Constr. 
Gazelles 
Top 
Perform. (1) vs. (2)   (2) vs. (3)   
Basic characteristics        
Age owner 34.7 37.7 37.5 0 *** 0.807  
Male  0.129 0.812 0.760 0 *** 0.003 *** 
No diploma 0.807 0.601 0.564 0 *** 0.084 * 
Primary completed 0.142 0.240 0.277 0 *** 0.049 ** 
Some secondary 0.030 0.070 0.074 0 *** 0.725  
Other post primary 0.021 0.089 0.085 0 *** 0.756  
Speaks French 0.337 0.583 0.620 0 *** 0.080 * 
No other opportunity 0.243 0.200 0.184 0 *** 0.345  
Age of firm 6.4 9.4 9.5 0 *** 0.758  
Sector        
Clothing and apparel 0.071 0.136 0.146 0 *** 0.501  
Other manufact. and food 0.153 0.161 0.165 0.413  0.789  
Construction 0.015 0.129 0.109 0 *** 0.168  
Wholesale/retail shops 0.094 0.109 0.096 0.062  0.363  
Petty trading 0.491 0.095 0.106 0 *** 0.413  
Hotels and restaurants 0.035 0.084 0.089 0 *** 0.731  
Repair services 0.013 0.094 0.089 0 *** 0.661  
Transport 0.003 0.077 0.101 0 *** 0.044 ** 
Other services 0.126 0.115 0.100 0.174  0.260  
Structural factors        
Firm set up with other person 0.032 0.065 0.083 0 *** 0.097  
Public wage worker in hh 0.110 0.098 0.096 0.135  0.859  
Private formal wage worker in hh 0.112 0.081 0.079 0 *** 0.884  
Household wealth index -0.182 -0.056 0.342 0.010 *** 0 *** 
Hands-on exper. larger firm 0.032 0.099 0.127 0 *** 0.039 ** 
Water connection 0.095 0.074 0.138 0.004 *** 0 *** 
Electricity connection 0.141 0.254 0.465 0 *** 0 *** 
Telec. (land line) 0.038 0.097 0.209 0 *** 0 *** 
Mobile location on the street 0.128 0.081 0.066 0 *** 0.216  
Fixed location on the street 0.110 0.107 0.111 0.662  0.734  
Vehicle serves as location 0.002 0.033 0.040 0 *** 0.397  
Firm located at home 0.304 0.206 0.141 0 *** 0 *** 
Fixed location on market 0.181 0.183 0.210 0.838  0.108  
Shop/restaurant 0.052 0.147 0.278 0 *** 0 *** 
Other location 0.113 0.285 0.372 0 *** 0 *** 
By family tradition 0.068 0.079 0.046 0.129  0.004 *** 
Share same ethnic group in neighb. 0.402 0.367 0.383 0 *** 0.181  
Largest ethnic group in country 0.424 0.402 0.386 0.089 * 0.461  
Second ethnic group in country 0.217 0.183 0.233 0 *** 0.003 *** 
Third ethnic group in country 0.098 0.097 0.104 0.935  0.636  
Internal migrant 0.469 0.481 0.437 0.352  0.038 ** 
Immigrant 0.053 0.097 0.076 0 *** 0.095 * 
Return migrant 0.079 0.068 0.067 0.116  0.884  
Table continues next page. 
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Table 4 … continued 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5)   
    t-Test  t-Test  
  Survivalists 
Constr. 
Gazelles 
Top 
Perform. (1) vs. (2)   (2) vs. (3)   
Behavioural factors        
Labour hours of owner 188.6 207.5 232.1 0 *** 0 *** 
Book keeping 0.253 0.337 0.467 0 *** 0 *** 
Financial literacy index -0.156 0.074 0.397 0 *** 0 *** 
Adjustment of supply to demand 0.649 0.684 0.745 0.004  0.002 *** 
New clients by publicity 0.255 0.243 0.253 0.296  0.572  
Active search for new clients 0.146 0.172 0.172 0.006  0.977  
Active reaction to demand shocks 0.683 0.686 0.762 0.761  0 *** 
Self-employment 0.830 0.629 0.352 0 *** 0 *** 
Would hire family members 0.531 0.375 0.298 0 *** 0 *** 
Would hire 'profess. from the market 0.120 0.304 0.355 0 *** 0.011 *** 
Member of business association 0.026 0.054 0.141 0 *** 0 *** 
Would register firm 0.222 0.442 0.611 0 *** 0 *** 
Risk aversion 0.113 0.070 0.074 0 *** 0.748  
N 2957 2965 643         
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: 123-survey, WAEMU 2001; own computations. 
 
(e) Behavioural heterogeneity  
Next, we examine to what extent survivalists, constrained gazelles and top-performers differ in 
terms of their behaviour in managing and controlling their firm. Hence, we include variables for 
book-keeping and an index of financial literacy based on questions regarding the knowledge of 
credit and other financial products. We also construct dummy variables from entrepreneurs’ 
answers to the following questions: Whether the entrepreneur (1) adjusts supply to actual or 
expected demand instead of just producing at the level of capacity, looks actively for new clients, 
(2) has problems to manage the firm, (3) would consider in case of a decline in demand to reduce 
profits, to diversify the activity or to improve the quality of the products, (4) is member of a 
business association,v and (5) would consider formalizing his or her firm. Moreover, we include 
log monthly working hours of the entrepreneur as a measure of individual effort. Finally we 
include the ratio of employed non-paid workers (so mainly family members) to total staff 
(including the owner), a control for self-employment and a dummy for whether the entrepreneur 
would consider hiring family members irrespective of their qualification rather than ex-workers 
from small or larger enterprises. We also add a very simple measure of risk aversion on the basis 
of a question that asks for the motivation for taking up the specific business activity. Here, one 
possible motivation is “Assurance of more stable receipts than in other products”, which we take 
as a sign of risk aversion. For about 10% of all entrepreneurs the corresponding ‘chosen because 
of stable-profits’ dummy is set to 1. We believe that this list covers the important dimensions of 
how entrepreneurs are capable of and actually managing their firms. 
The means of these variables are again shown in Table 4. The first striking feature is that 
top-performers do better than the two other groups almost along all variables we consider here. 
Recall that our initial classification is just based on past capital accumulation and capital 
productivity, hence these findings validate our approach along many dimensions, although to 
some extent the causal effect might be reverse, i.e. entrepreneurial success leads to the adoption 
of better management practices. The second striking feature is that the constrained gazelles are in 
many cases very close to the top-performers and in almost all cases clearly different from the 
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survivalists. Constrained gazelles clearly work more hours than survivalists, they keep more often 
books, have a much higher financial literacy, react better to demand shocks and search actively 
for new clients; the latter as often as the top-performers. Moreover, similar to top-performers, 
the constrained gazelles have a much lower preference for hiring family members and a much 
higher preference for hiring workers from the market. Constrained gazelles are also more often 
than survivalists member of a business association and consider more often to formally register 
their business. Finally, constrained gazelles show the same level of risk aversion - as imperfect as 
this measure might be - as the top-performers. Here as well, the significant difference in the 
management behaviour of constrained gazelles compared to survivalists and their closeness to 
the top-performers can be seen as an ex-post validation of our approach. Although survivalists 
and constrained gazelles have similar levels of capital stock, constrained gazelles show much 
higher management skills and seem to be more entrepreneurial than survivalists. Again, all the 
skills we consider here were not used as a criterion in the initial classification; hence it is not 
obvious to find these patterns. 
Taken together the results in Table 4 suggest that constrained gazelles are entrepreneurs who 
show a clear potential to become top-performers. They are mainly constrained by their external 
environment, i.e. access to finance, to a fixed business location and to basic infrastructure. 
However, internal constraints do not seem to be binding or at least to be the main problem. We 
think it is this feature, which makes this group so interesting for possible policy interventions. 
Survivalists in contrast do not only face serious external constraints; they would also need policy 
interventions that improve their education and skills, i.e. interventions with long-term targets that 
are likely to be much more costly. 
(f) Extended partitioning 
Based on the behavioural differences introduced above we have repeated the partition procedure, 
i.e. based on the probit model specified in Equation (1) augmented by behavioural factors. This 
revision allows for a finer classification of firms and for isolating a narrower group of constrained 
gazelles. Such an augmented model implies a larger variance in the distribution of predicted 
probabilities. We can also expect on average higher predicted probabilities of being a top-
performer among top-performers since we better account for their strengths. This in turn will 
lead – given our partition criterion requiring identical average predicted probabilities of top-
performers and constrained gazelles – to a smaller share of constrained gazelles and, 
consequently, a larger share of survivalists. Both partitions together can be interpreted as an 
upper and lower bound estimate for the share of constrained gazelles. The modified partition is 
shown in the Appendix (Table A2); between 20% and 30% of all informal entrepreneurs can be 
identified as constrained gazelles. However, for the remainder of our paper, we further use the 
initial partition performed in Section 4(b), but get back to the extended partition in our 
conclusion. 
5 RETURNS TO CAPITAL 
In this section we estimate marginal returns to capital for all firms together and for each of the 
three segments of firms separately. We are particularly interested in whether such estimates 
confirm an untapped growth potential of constrained gazelles relative to survivalists. The 
regressions explain value added by capital and labour and a number of characteristics of the 
entrepreneur including proxies for management skills. Estimating such functions will mainly 
answer two important questions: First, to what extent do the above described differences 
between the three groups result in higher value added, i.e. how important is education, 
knowledge of French and a certain managerial attitude? Second, do the returns to capital differ 
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between the three groups under consideration? This is important as capital is generally seen as a 
crucial input and bottleneck targeted by many policy interventions (e.g. micro-credit programs). 
We estimate the value added function separately for each group using our initial partition. 
However, we need to make one modification to this partition. Given the definition of top-
performers (high capital stock and high value-added to capital ratio) the group of constrained 
gazelles exhibits a capital-value added scatter plot, in which the upper-left corner is virtually 
empty, since the firms located there are classified as top-performers. This may lead to a biased 
estimate of the return to capital as it is difficult to adjust a regression line to such a selected 
sample. Hence, in order to perform these regressions, we split the group of top-performers and 
constrained gazelles differently. For each country we compute the median capital stock among 
the group of top-performers. We then attribute all firms with a capital stock above that limit to 
the group of top-performers independent of their capital productivity and all firms below that 
limit to the group of constrained gazelles. This procedure reclassifies 540 constrained gazelles to 
the group of top performers and 322 top-performers to the group of constrained gazelles. This 
manipulation does not change significantly the structure of the group of constrained gazelles. The 
changes are slightly larger for the group of top-performers, but also far from being substantial.  
The value added function we estimate reads as follows: 
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where ln vaij stands for the log of value added of firm i in segment j. The segments refer to our 
groups of survivalists, constrained gazelles and top-performers, respectively. Ln Kij stands for the 
log of physical capital. Given that many firms do not use any capital, we set ln Kij to zero for 
those firms and introduce an additional dummy variable, NOKij, that takes the value one for the 
same. This ensures that we obtain unbiased estimates of the returns to capital in the presence of 
zero observations of capital (Battese, 1997). Ln Lij stands for the monthly working hours 
including those of the firm owner and unpaid family members or other unpaid staff, such as 
trainees. The vector Xij includes standard characteristics of the owner including age, age squared, 
education, knowledge of French, gender and the age of the firm. The vector Mij includes the 
above discussed management skills. Finally, we control for sector (Sij) and country effects (Eij). 
For all three groups we first estimate Equation (5) with and then without Mij.
vi 
The results are shown in Table 5. The first two columns show the coefficients we obtain if 
we estimate the value added function for all three groups together. The signs of all coefficients 
are as expected. The estimated capital elasticity is roughly 0.15. We note a clear positive 
association between education and value added. Most of the business skills are also significantly 
associated with value added. If we estimate the models for the three groups of entrepreneurs 
separately, a first striking finding is that the production elasticities of capital, 61j, are high in all 
three segments, but continuously increasing if we go from the group of survivalists to the group 
of top-performers. The latter is significantly different for top-performers compared to 
constrained gazelles and for survivalists. However, the more relevant measure is the monthly 
marginal return to capital, i.e. the production elasticity times the actual capital productivity, 61j · 
vaj/Kj. To compute the monthly marginal return to capital, we use the average value added and 
capital stock observed in each segment. The marginal returns are shown at the bottom of Table 
5. The marginal return is indeed highest among the constrained gazelles. If we increased the 
capital stock of a constrained gazelle by 10 Intl. $, this firm would increase its monthly value 
added by about 2 Intl. $, or 20%. The corresponding marginal increase of survivalists would only 
be 0.2 to 3 Intl. $, a fairly low return. The finding of high returns at very low levels of capital for 
the constrained gazelles is at odds with the typical assumption of a standard poverty trap model à 
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la Banerjee and Newman (1993). It is important to highlight that this result is quite robust with 
respect to the functional form. For instance, we find very similar results if we estimate a more 
flexible specification in polynomials with capital and capital squared instead of the double-log 
specification. Finally, similar estimates are obtained using a semi-parametric approach that 
explores in even more detail the pattern of the apparent heterogeneity in returns. Moreover, the 
parametric estimates of the controls (in this semi-parametric specification) are very close to those 
of the fully parametric specification, which again shows that the estimated parameters are not 
overly sensitive to changes in the specification. Finally, these results also hold if we specify and 
estimate a profit equation with value added minus all costs including the imputed value of the 
owner’s time on the left-hand-side.vii  
It is important to note that although returns of the top-performers are considerably lower 
than those of constrained gazelles, they are reasonably high with about 6% to 7%% per month. 
Put differently, the finding of lower returns at the top compared to the returns experienced by 
constrained gazelles should not be taken as an indication that investments do not pay off in the 
long run. The high returns for the constrained gazelles are rather the immediate consequence of 
the constraints these entrepreneurs face. Returns to labour are also high, but differ less across the 
three segments. Education effects are not very pronounced due to the fact that by construction 
each segment is relatively homogenous in these characteristics. They are in turn highly significant 
in columns (1) and (2), when the pooled sample is used. Moreover, value added increases with 
the firm’s age (recall that firms can change ownership; hence the current manger’s age and the 
firm’s age are two different dimensions). Older firms are more productive - even when 
controlling for the accumulated capital stock and labour used.  Whether these and the other 
effects are significantly different across groups can best be seen in Table 6 (see discussion below). 
Gender effects again show a very interesting pattern. While women within the survivalists 
and to some extent within the constrained gazelles generate lower value added, top-performer 
women generate higher value added, ceteris paribus, than their male counterparts. About 20% of 
the top-performers are women and they are mainly in the manufacturing sectors and in the 
restaurants/hotels sector. Studying the driving forces of these gender effects is beyond the scope 
of this paper. Yet, recent studies that have examined these forces in more detail do, for instance, 
not find evidence for a lower inherent demand for finance. It rather seems that performance 
differences can be explained by gender gaps related to the use of financial services and education. 
In addition, female business is often only a secondary activity next to housework (Aterido et al., 
2011). Similarly, the obligation to combine housework with the market activity seems to force 
many women to operate their business from home, which often means to be far from input 
markets and clients. This latter aspect is also confirmed by our data. Whereas only 17% of the 
male entrepreneurs operate from hone, among women this share is 35%. All this may explain 
why women among the survivalists and constrained gazelles generate a lower value added. For 
Ghana, Fafchamps et al. (2011) also find female entrepreneurs to have a higher propensity to 
channel resources to household expenses and transfers instead of investment. Their findings also 
suggest that women who operate with larger capital stocks are quite successful and do take 
advantage of business opportunities. This is consistent with our results.  
The effects associated with the indicators we use to account for the management abilities are 
in most cases as expected. Practicing some form of accounting for instance increases value added 
by 30% to 50%. Again, we have to be careful with the estimated orders of magnitude as we do 
not attempt to control here for reverse causality. In addition, there are unobservable variables 
that can introduce a bias. However, the large set of introduced measures for skills and 
management attitude should dampen the typical unobserved ability bias. The capital elasticities 
are indeed slightly lower once we control for skills and management attitude.viii Being member of 
a business association, adjusting quickly to demand shocks and having an active approach to find 
new clients is typically associated with higher value added. Financial literacy comes out as 
significant for the survivalists and the constrained gazelles, with a larger effect for the former. 
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Table 5: Drivers of performance 
  All Survivalists Constrained perf. Top performers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Log of capital 0.148*** 0.137*** 0.105*** 0.089*** 0.133*** 0.126*** 0.352*** 0.331*** 
 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.019) (0.043) (0.043) 
No capital (=1) 0.404*** 0.346*** 0.113 0.073 0.482*** 0.440*** 
  
 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.083) (0.083) (0.109) (0.109) 
  log total hours of labour 0.482*** 0.458*** 0.367*** 0.329*** 0.512*** 0.512*** 0.552*** 0.538***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.031) (0.033) (0.026) (0.029) (0.048) (0.051) 
Age owner 0.038*** 0.029*** 0.034*** 0.023*** 0.029** 0.019 0.002 0.003 
 
(0.007) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.024) (0.023) 
Age owner squared -0.046*** -0.035*** -0.045*** -0.030*** -0.034** -0.019 -0.009 -0.007 
 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.028) (0.028) 
Male (=1) 0.364*** 0.337*** 0.338*** 0.295*** 0.083 0.027 -0.570*** -0.566*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.075) (0.075) (0.069) (0.069) (0.117) (0.115) 
No diploma Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
         Primary completed 0.075* 0.047 0.126* 0.041 -0.018 -0.050 -0.252** -0.241**
 
(0.044) (0.044) (0.076) (0.077) (0.062) (0.062) (0.110) (0.109) 
Some secondary 0.263*** 0.153** 0.381** 0.174 0.122 0.049 0.171 0.011 
 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.148) (0.151) (0.094) (0.094) (0.159) (0.158) 
Other post primary 0.370*** 0.197*** 0.215 -0.075 0.284*** 0.220** 0.049 -0.127 
 
(0.073) (0.073) (0.185) (0.188) (0.097) (0.099) (0.138) (0.141) 
Speaks French (=1) 0.122*** 0.077** 0.037 0.011 0.124** 0.064 0.212** 0.189* 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.059) (0.059) (0.057) (0.057) (0.103) (0.101) 
Age of firm 0.016*** 0.014*** 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.008 0.008 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.005) 
Book keeping 
 
0.434*** 
 
0.479*** 
 
0.465*** 
 
0.279*** 
(0.042) (0.080) (0.058) (0.088) 
Financial literacy index 
 
0.040*** 
 
0.087*** 
 
0.017 
 
0.006 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.022) 
Adjustment of supply to demand 
 
0.120*** 
 
0.141*** 
 
0.148*** 
 
-0.026 
  
(0.031) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.085) 
Table continues next page. 
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Table 5 … continued 
  All Survivalists Constrained perf. Top performers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
New clients by publicity 0.078** 0.044 0.042 0.213** 
  
(0.035) 
 
(0.052) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.097) 
Active search for new clients 
 
0.253*** 
 
0.301*** 
 
0.171*** 
 
0.151 
  
(0.040) 
 
(0.064) 
 
(0.061) 
 
(0.102) 
Active reaction to demand shocks 0.035 0.027 0.016 0.240*** 
  
(0.031) 
 
(0.047) 
 
(0.046) 
 
(0.082) 
Faces management problems  -0.054 -0.087 -0.050 -0.036 
  
(0.089) 
 
(0.136) 
 
(0.151) 
 
(0.191) 
Share non-paid staff (excl. owner) 
 
-0.034 
 
0.135* 
 
-0.174*** 
 
-0.077 
  
(0.041) 
 
(0.074) 
 
(0.058) 
 
(0.090) 
Member of business association 
 
0.436*** 
 
0.493*** 
 
0.418*** 
 
0.187 
  
(0.069) 
 
(0.141) 
 
(0.100) 
 
(0.116) 
Risk aversion  
 
-0.045 
 
-0.021 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.047 
(0.050) (0.069) (0.087) (0.134) 
Clothing and apparel Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  Ref.  
Other manufact. and food 0.390*** 0.377*** 0.313*** 0.359*** 0.470*** 0.522*** 0.597*** 0.557*** 
(0.056) (0.056) (0.101) (0.100) (0.078) (0.077) (0.141) (0.139) 
Construction 1.039*** 1.026*** 1.288*** 1.216*** 1.003*** 1.024*** 1.661*** 1.686*** 
 
(0.070) (0.069) (0.225) (0.223) (0.082) (0.083) (0.185) (0.184) 
Wholesale/retail shops 0.408*** 0.396*** 0.206* 0.269** 0.552*** 0.535*** 0.591*** 0.561*** 
 
(0.063) (0.063) (0.110) (0.111) (0.090) (0.091) (0.147) (0.147) 
Petty trading 0.290*** 0.250*** 0.295*** 0.293*** 0.433*** 0.431*** 1.147*** 1.117*** 
 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.090) (0.090) (0.090) (0.091) (0.188) (0.187) 
Hotels and restaurants 0.743*** 0.722*** 1.125*** 1.097*** 0.340*** 0.308*** 0.520*** 0.435** 
 
(0.072) (0.072) (0.150) (0.148) (0.097) (0.098) (0.177) (0.177) 
Repair services 0.109 0.133* -0.066 -0.072 0.125 0.204** 0.480*** 0.449*** 
 
(0.074) (0.074) (0.223) (0.227) (0.090) (0.090) (0.165) (0.163) 
Transport 0.745*** 0.711*** 0.582 0.695 0.732*** 0.694*** 0.807*** 0.699*** 
 
(0.081) (0.081) (0.774) (0.765) (0.115) (0.115) (0.146) (0.151) 
Table continues next page. 
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Table 5 … continued 
  All Survivalists Constrained perf. Top performers 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Other services 0.416*** 0.420*** 0.511*** 0.528*** 0.357*** 0.408*** 0.624*** 0.544*** 
 
(0.060) (0.060) (0.103) (0.102) (0.088) (0.087) (0.167) (0.165) 
Country effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
                  
Test of equality of capital elasticity col. (6) vs. col. (4) 0.433 
Test of equality of capital elasticity col. (6) vs. col. (8) 
   
0.000*** 
  
         R-squared 0.421 0.448 0.216 0.244 0.325 0.345 0.391 0.406
N 5757 5676 2580 2540 2384 2346 786 780 
         Mean yearly value added (Intl. $ 2001) 4083 4202 1673 1646 4675 5027 11620 11458
Mean capital stock (Intl. $ 2001) 919 924 351 350 253 253 5204 5160 
MRK at mean (monthly), % 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.20 0.21 0.07 0.06 
                  
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at neighborhood level. MRK stands for Marginal  
Return to Capital. 
Source: 123-survey, WAEMU 2001; own estimations. 
25 
 
The coefficients associated with the ratio of non-paid staff to total staff are very interesting. 
While it has a positive sign for the group of survivalists, it is negative for constrained gazelles and 
top-performers, although for the latter statistically not significant. This suggests that non-paid 
staff – i.e. primarily family members – are less productive than hired staff in growth-oriented 
firms. This may partly be driven by behaviour (e.g. more difficult to monitor) and partly by skill 
differences. It also explains why a large share of top-performers and somewhat lower share of 
constrained gazelles reports to prefer to hire non-family members (cf. Table 4). Our measure of 
risk aversion is insignificant in all three regressions. The sector-specific level effects vary across 
the three groups. Survivalists achieve the highest value added in construction and 
restaurants/catering. Constrained gazelles are most productive in construction, as survivalists, 
and in transport. Among the top-performers, it is again construction, transport, retail shops and, 
surprisingly, petty trading.   
Finally, to further analyze the sources of the differences in value added between the three 
groups, we perform a Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973, Oaxaca, 1973). This 
decomposition allows attributing differences in outcomes to endowment and price effects. In our 
case this exercise decomposes group differences in value added into differences in factor use 
including capital, labour, skills and other characteristics, on the one hand, and, differences in the 
returns to these factors, on the other. The relative importance of so-called endowment versus 
price effects is important for the design of policies, as policies can either address endowments per 
se or the effectiveness of using them. Regarding the comparison between constrained gazelles 
and top performers, we expect differences in value added to be mainly explained by differences 
in capital, and possibly labour. In contrast, we expect that differences between survivalists and 
constrained gazelles can mainly be attributed to all endowments other than capital (and labour), 
such as education and management skills, as well as differences in the returns to these 
endowments. 
 
The decomposition formula reads as follows: 
 
 kkkkkkkjjjjjj ESMXLKEESMXLKEva pi
')],,,,,(),,,,,([ln −=∆  
 )(),,,,,( ' kjkkkkkk ESMXLKE pipi −+  
 ),()],,,,,(),,,,,([ ' kjkkkkkkjjjjjj ESMXLKEESMXLKE pipi −−+  (6) 
 
where the first component is the endowment effect, the second component is the coefficient 
effect, and the third component is an interaction term. The latter accounts for the fact that 
differences in endowments and coefficients exist simultaneously. Note that the decomposition is 
formulated from the viewpoint of group k. If k stands for constrained gazelles it means that we 
compute the endowment effect by evaluating the contribution of endowments using the 
constrained gazelles’ returns. Conversely, coefficient effects are computed alternatively the other 
groups’ returns to evaluate the constrained gazelle’s endowments.ix  
Table 6 shows the decomposition results of the comparison between constrained gazelles 
and survivalists (column 1) and between constrained gazelles and top-performers (column 2), 
respectively. On top figures the log difference in value added for these two group-comparisons. 
For the comparison between survivalists and constrained gazelles, we hence aim to explain the 
sources of the observed 1.021 difference in the average log annual value added between 
constrained gazelles and survivalists (the value added of constrained gazelles is about 2.7 times 
higher). This difference can be attributed to endowment and coefficient components, and within 
these components, to single factors. The difference in log value added between constrained 
gazelles and survivalists can mainly be attributed to endowment effects (84%), while coefficient 
26 
 
or price effects explain 36%. There is also a residual that contributes negatively to the observed 
difference. The endowment effect is mainly driven by the gender difference (constrained gazelles 
are more often operated by men), labour hours (constrained gazelles work more hours per 
month) and sector choice (constrained gazelles chose sectors with higher potential returns). The 
coefficient effect is mainly driven by a difference in returns to labour and to education. The 
‘returns to capital effect’ is in favour of constrained gazelles, but is not statistically significant. 
 
Table 6 
Oaxaca Decomposition of differences  
in mean value added between groups 
  Constr.  Top-perf. 
  vs. Survival vs. Constr. 
Log annual value added 
    Constr. / Top-perf. 7.719 
 
8.580 
 Survival / Constr. 6.698 
 
7.708 
 Difference 1.021 *** 0.872 *** 
     Endowment effects 
Capital 8% *** 41% *** 
Labour (hours) 11% *** 33% *** 
Exp./Age, Educ., Language 4% ** 3% *** 
Male  20% *** 0% 
 Age of firm 5% *** 0% 
 Business attitude 7% *** 6% *** 
Sector  14% *** 0% 
Country 16% *** -5% *** 
Total 84% *** 77% *** 
     Coefficients 
    Capital 15% 
 
74% *** 
Labour (hours) 70% *** -3% 
 Exp./Age, Educ., Language 8% -44% 
Male  -2% * -34% *** 
Age of firm -4% -5% 
Business attitude -7% 
 
5% 
 Sector  0% 
 
24% ** 
Country -1% 
 
-16% 
 Constant -44% 
 
-55% 
 Total 36% *** -53% *** 
     Interaction -17% ** 72% *** 
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
Source: 123-survey, WAEMU 2001; own estimations. 
 
The decomposition for the comparison ‘top-performers versus constrained gazelles’ renders 
completely different results: Here, the entire difference in value added is explained by the 
endowment effect, in particular capital and labour. In contrast, the coefficient effect is largely 
driven by the return to capital and sector choice in favour of top-performers. This is partly offset 
by gender effects in favour of constrained gazelles. It should be noted that a significant effect 
implies that the effect of the corresponding variable is significantly different with respect to its 
effect on value added between the two groups of entrepreneurs considered.x 
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6 POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Informal small-scale economic activities account for an important share of production in many 
developing countries. The contribution of these activities to employment is even larger, in some 
cases exceeding 80% of total employment. Early views on structural change and economic 
growth often posited that a modern sector consisting of larger firms would absorb those 
employed in a traditional or informal sector. This has happened to some extent in some 
developing economies, but not to the extent implied by earlier development theories. Moreover, 
especially in somewhat more dynamic economies of Latin America and (South) East Asia, many 
informal entrepreneurs choose to stay informal, and should not be perceived as waiting for a job 
in the formal sector (Maloney 2004). In contrast, in less dynamic economies with a less 
pronounced missing middle in particular in Africa (Fafchamps 1994, Tybout 2000), much larger 
shares of involuntary survivalist entrepreneurs are likely to be found, who would prefer a 
relatively secure formal sector job if only such jobs were available. In addition, and very urgent 
from a policy perspective, millions of young people will enter the labour market in the developing 
world in the next two decades, in particular in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, and many 
of them will be absorbed in the informal sector. This scenario makes it necessary to rethink and 
challenge some common assumptions and views on informal entrepreneurs and to improve the 
integration of informal sector with labour market policies. 
Our main message to policy makers is that the typical informal entrepreneur, also in non- 
dynamic economies in Africa, should not too easily be labelled a survivalist waiting for a job 
opportunity, without entrepreneurial capacities or growth potential. We argue and show that 
among those entrepreneurs typically considered survivalists – mainly because they operate with 
very little capital and generate low profits in absolute terms – there is a substantial share of 
entrepreneurs with business skills and an entrepreneurial behaviour that resembles skills and 
behaviour of upper tier entrepreneurs – or top-performers as we call them. Our data clearly show 
that very high marginal returns to capital can be earned by many of the very small informal 
businesses. In our basic partition, the share of the constrained gazelles ranges from 28% (Benin) 
to 58% (Cote d’Ivoire). In our more refined partition, that explicitly includes the distribution of 
managerial abilities of entrepreneurs, this share ranges from 19% (Togo) to 34% (Cote d’Ivoire). 
The two partitions can be seen as an upper and lower bound of the gazelles’ segment’s size. It 
would be naïve to think that an exact threshold could be defined. We rather want to emphasise 
that a substantial share of firms with very low capital stocks shows strong entrepreneurial 
dynamism. 
These constrained gazelles are mainly constrained by their business environment, i.e. external 
constraints such as the lack of access to capital, insurance and productive infrastructure. 
Individual or internal constraints such as education, specific business skills are not the key 
restriction to these businesses. They already show a minimum of financial literacy, keep books 
and react flexibly to change in market conditions. The true survivalists in turn, lack all these 
capacities. Hence, our findings may be taken as an argument for providing these constrained 
gazelles with credit, savings devices, and insurance; the latter not necessarily to insure business-
related risks, but rather to cover important household related risks, such as health shocks and 
death. Obviously, each of these policies needs to be examined carefully in its specific context, but 
such an assessment goes beyond the scope of this paper.  
For survivalist in turn the policy menu needs to be broader as both business environment and 
individual constraints are binding. In this segment, we find in particular female entrepreneurs 
with very low education levels who routinely have to combine their entrepreneurial activity with 
housework. Amine and Staub (2009) rightly emphasize that the socio-cultural environment and 
prevailing norms place a particular burden on women who desire to become entrepreneurs or to 
expand an entrepreneurial business. This implies that this very comprehensive set of constraints 
needs to be taken into account when policies towards female survivalists are designed. Many male 
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survivalist entrepreneurs would prefer and be better off with a job as a wage worker. Some of 
these jobs could be provided by constrained gazelles if their potential can be unlocked.  
In terms of targeting, our analysis suggests that a relatively small set of commonly observable 
characteristics, such as education, age, language skills, sector choice, management practices, are 
probably sufficient to keep targeting errors within a reasonable range, in particular given the likely 
costs of more precise targeting mechanisms. In such an approach, we would expect that between 
a third and a half of all micro and small entrepreneurs would be able to make good use of credit 
and savings devices. Given that at least in the countries we focus on almost none of these 
services are available for this informal segment of the economy and given the significant numbers 
of new labour market entrants, we feel it is worthwhile to start taking steps in this direction.  
7 CONCLUSION 
The literature on urban informal entrepreneurs emphasises at least two types of heterogeneity. 
First, a more anthropological and sociological strand posits the existence of two qualitatively 
distinct and persisting groups of entrepreneurs in the informal sector, an upper tier with a 
growth-orientation versus a lower tier of entrepreneurs focused on survival. Various recent 
studies in a second more economic strand find heterogeneity in capital productivity among 
informal entrepreneurs, where entrepreneurs working with (very) low levels of capital stock earn 
very high marginal returns to capital. In this paper we combine these observations, using a 
representative sample of urban informal entrepreneurs from seven capital cities in West Africa.  
We empirically identify a third segment of entrepreneurs who are neither top performers nor 
survivalists. This group – which we label ‘constrained gazelles’ – shares many characteristics with 
top-performers, they even show similar managerial abilities in running their firm, but they operate 
with substantially lower capital stocks. Their stock of capital is almost as low as that of most 
survivalists. However, they are much more productive and can thus earn much higher returns to 
capital than survivalists.  
From a policy perspective, being able to isolate constrained gazelles from the other two 
segments of informal entrepreneurs is a potentially important step towards a more differentiated 
informal sector policy menu. Moreover, our data shows that identification of constrained gazelles 
could be straightforward, which makes effective targeting possible for this attractive additional 
target group for dedicated policy interventions.  
Informal sector heterogeneity continues to defy easy generalizations (Mead and Morrisson 
1996). Nevertheless, based on our representative sample from seven capital cities in francophone 
West Africa, we show that the relative size of the group of constrained gazelles relative to 
survivalists is related to the structural characteristics of the respective economies, such as the 
urbanisation rate, the weight of agriculture in the economy and the size of the public and formal 
private sectors. Generally, we find a higher share of constrained gazelles in the more dynamic 
economies. Arguably, the seven capital cities in West Africa belong to the economically less 
dynamic capitals in the developing world. Therefore, we expect to find at least similar shares of 
constrained gazelles in the informal sector of economically more dynamic developing countries.xi  
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Appendix: Definition of all variables used 
Table A1: Definition of all variables used 
  
Owner characteristics  
Male Takes the value one if the entrepreneur is a man 
Age owner Age of entrepreneur in years  
Speaks French “Yes” answered to the question “Do you know to read and write in French?” 
Education Measured via highest diploma achieved in formal school system 
Internal migrant Entrepreneur migrated from another city or the country side to the capital. 
Immigrant Entrepreneur immigrated from abroad. 
Return migrant Entrepreneur was abroad, and returned to his/her country of origin. 
Ethnicity To ensure comparability across countries, we classify entrepreneurs whether they 
belong to the most frequent group in their country, the second most frequent etc. 
Share same ethnic group in 
neighbourhood 
Share of the population in the  neighbourhood that belongs to the same ethnic 
group 
No other opportunity Entrepreneur started business because he/she could not find a job as a wage 
worker 
By family tradition Entrepreneur started business because it is a family tradition 
Hands-on experience in 
larger firm 
Entrepreneur worked previously in a larger farm as a trainee (larger than current 
firm) 
Book-keeping Entrepreneur keeps books of his/her activity 
Financial literacy index Index based on knowledge of credit and other financial products 
Adjustment of supply to 
demand 
Entrepreneur reports to adjust his/her supply to demand 
 
New clients by publicity Entrepreneur reports to undertake efforts to make publicity in his/her 
neighbourhood and family 
Active search for new 
clients Entrepreneur reports to actively look for new clients. 
Active reaction to demand 
shocks 
In response to a strong decline in demand, entrepreneur reduces his/her profit, 
diversifies and/or increases the quality of products 
Would hire family members If entrepreneur expanded he/she would hire family members 
Would hire 'professionals' 
from the market If entrepreneur expanded he/she would hire workers on a competitive basis 
Business organization Entrepreneur is member of a business organization  
Register Entrepreneur is in principle ready and willing to formally register his/her firm 
Risk aversion Dummy variable indicating the motivation for taking up the specific activity. 
Answer: “Assurance of more stable receipts than in other products” (no multiple 
answers possible) 
  
Household characteristics  
Household size The number of all household members that stayed in the household for more than 
six months eat their meals together cooked in the same kitchen and accept the 
authority of the same household head 
Household wealth index First principal component of a principal components analysis, included variables: 
Housing characteristics (floor, number of rooms, electric light, tap water, sanitation 
facilities), TV, Hifi, Video, gas cooker 
Only informal firm Household does only have one or several informal firms, but no other sources of 
market income  
Public wage earner At least one household member is a wage earner in the public sector 
Private formal wage earner At least one household member is a wage earner in the private formal sector 
Other combination Any other combination, e.g. household has in addition a formal firm 
Table continues next page.  
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Table A1 … continued  
 
Firm characteristics  
Age of firm 
Years since firm was established irrespective whether current owner was already 
involved 
Firm set up with other 
person 
Firm was established jointly with another person 
 
Annual. VA in intl.$ PPP Annual value added evaluated at 2001 international $. Value added is measured as 
turnover minus the costs for intermediate inputs; hence it includes all paid wages, 
the implied income of the owner and unpaid family members or other unpaid 
workers, such as trainees. 
Monthly hours owner Self-reported number of hours worked in firm last month 
Total monthly hours Self-reported total number of hours used in firm last month 
Self-employment Owner operates without any additional staff. 
Hired paid staff Number of hired staff that is paid 
Share of non-paid staff 
(excl. owner) Share of non-paid staff (excl. owner) in firm 
Share of non-paid staff Share of workers that are not paid 
No capital Firm operates without any physical capital 
Capital in intl. $ PPP Replacement value of all business-related assets, that have been used for the 
operation of the enterprise in the last year,  including the business establishment, 
machines, furniture, vehicles and utilities 
Water connection Water connection available in firm  
Electricity connection Electricity connection available in firm 
Telecommunication (land 
line) Phone connection (land line) available in firm 
Mobile location on the 
street No fixed location for activity 
Fixed location on the street Fixed location on the street  
Vehicle serves as location Activity is operated from vehicle 
Firm located at home Firm is located at home. 
Fixed location on market Fixed location on a market 
Shop/restaurant Firm is a shop or a restaurant 
Other location Any other type of location, not listed above 
Sector dummies Take value 1 if firm is in respective sector (exclusive), 0 otherwise 
Country dummies Take value 1 if firm is in respective country (exclusive), 0 otherwise 
Source: 123-survey, WAEMU 2001; own presentation. 
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Appendix: Modified partition of the informal sector into groups, using a larger set of explanatory variables 
 
Table A2: Modified partition based on augmented set of explanatory variables 
  Benin Burkina Faso 
Cote 
d'Ivoire Mali Niger Senegal Togo 
Partition informal sector (shares)       
Top-performers  0.099 0.097 0.096 0.099 0.097 0.099 0.096 
Constrained gazelles 0.240 0.220 0.342 0.272 0.254 0.311 0.191 
Survivalists 0.661 0.683 0.562 0.629 0.649 0.590 0.713 
Source: 123-survey, WAEMU 2001; own estimations 
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Notes 
 
i A segment is defined as a relatively homogenous group of entrepreneurs that share similar 
characteristics and are significantly different from other groups (Nichter and Goldmark, 2009). 
ii The term ‘gazelle’ originates from the United States literature on high performance small 
firms (Boston and Boston, 2007).   
iii It might also not apply to those entrepreneurs that see their activity clearly as a side activity 
that complements other income sources but is on purpose kept small. 
iv The surveys were carried out by AFRISTAT and the National Statistical Institutes (INS) with 
the support of DIAL as part of the Regional Program of Statistical Support for Multilateral 
Surveillance (PARSTAT). 
v Business associations mainly provide training and access to input and final product markets 
but usually they do not provide any finance. 
vi When running the regression, we always correct standard errors for intra-cluster correlations. 
In total across the seven countries, there are 558 clusters in Phase 2. Moreover to reduce a bias 
due to measurement and reporting errors, we trim the data and drop influential outliers from 
our sample that we identify by the DFITS-statistic. As suggested by Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch 
(1980), we use a cut-off-value NkDFITS
ihj /2>  with k , the degrees of freedom (plus 1) 
and N  the number of observations. Depending on the estimation, this procedure removes 
between 50 and 130 observations from our sample. 
vii All these estimates can be obtained upon request from the authors. 
viii For various robustness checks of similar estimates, see Grimm et al. (2011). 
ix To perform this decomposition, we used the Stata macro ‘oaxaca’. For details see Jann. 
(2008). 
x For instance the fact that the labour hours effect in Table 6 makes a significant contribution 
to the explanation of the difference in value added between survivalists and constrained 
gazelles implies that the effect of labour on value added is significantly different for both 
groups (the coefficient in Table 6 is much higher for constrained gazelles compared to 
survivalists). 
xi Indeed, applying exactly the same method we find similar evidence for Madagascar (41.4%), 
Vietnam (40.2%) and Peru (30.6%). For Madagascar and Peru the data is based on exactly the 
same type of questionnaire.  
